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This article provides a survey of Security in Grid Services coming from a study of many papers most of which were 
done by the Grid Forum OGSA-SEC (Open Grid Service Architecture Security) working group, GSI (Grid Security 
Infrastructure) working group, and Globus Alliance team and other people who contributed to Grid. It describes the best 
practice in terms of Grid Security Challenges, Grid Security Requirements, and the GT3 (Globus Toolkit version 3) 
Security Model for OGSA. Most of these were further refined in separate documents. 
 




The term "Grid" denotes a proposed distributed 
computing infrastructure for advanced science and 
engineering [1, 2].  The Grid Security Infrastructure 
(GSI) was subsequently developed, based on existing 
standards, to address the unique security requirements 
that arise in Grid environments, as described in [3, 4, 5].  
 
Research and development efforts within the Grid 
community have produced protocols, services, and tools 
that address the challenges arising when we seek to 
build scalable virtual organizations (VOs). Here a 
virtual organization is defined as a set of individuals or 
institutions sharing resources and services under a set of 
rules and policies governing the extent and conditions 
for that sharing [6].  
 
Controlling access to services through robust security 
protocols and security policy is paramount to 
controlling access to VO resources and assets. Thus, 
authentication mechanisms are required so that the 
identity of individuals and services can be established, 
and service providers must implement authorization 
mechanisms to enforce policy over how each service 
can be used. The requirement for composition 
complicates issues of policy enforcement, as one must 
be able to apply and enforce policy at all levels of 
composition and to translate policies between levels of 
composition [6]. 
 
Grid computing research has produced security 
technologies based not on direct interorganizational 
trust relationship but rather on the use of the VO as a 
bridge among the entities participating in a particular 
community or function. The results of this research have 
been incorporated into a widely used software system 
called the Globus Toolkit (GT)[3] that uses public key 
technologies to address issue of single sign-on, 
delegation [7], and identity mapping, while supporting 
standardized APIs such as GSS-API [8].  
 
The recent definition of the Open Grid Services 
Infrastructure specification and other elements of the 
Open Grid Services Architecture (OGSA) [9] within the 
Global Grid Forum introduce new challenges and 
opportunities for Grid security. 
 
Integration of GSI with OGSA enables the use of Web 
services techniques to express and publish policy [10], 
allowing applications to determine automatically what 
security policies and mechanisms are required of them. 
Implementing security in the form of OGSA services 
allows those services to be used as needed by 
applications to meet these requirements [11]. 
 
The remainder of this document is structured as follows. 
First, the following sections present a review of security 
challenges encountered in grid environments. Then 
discuss the security requirements. At last the document 
survey an OGSA security model and the GT security 
model.  
 
2. SECURITY CHALLENGES IN A GRID 
ENVIRONMENT [6] 
 
The security challenges faced in a Grid environment can 
be grouped into three categories. A solution within a 
given category will often depend on a solution in 
another category.  
 
2.1 The Integration Challenge 
 
It is unreasonable to expect that a single security 
technology can be defined that will both address all 
Grid security challenges and be adopted in every 
hosting environment. Thus, to be successful, a Grid 
security architecture needs to step up to the challenge of 
integrating with existing security architectures and 
models across platforms and hosting environments. This 
means that the architecture must be implementation 
agnostic, so that it can be instantiated in terms of any 
existing security mechanisms (e.g., Kerberos, PKI); 
extensible, so that it can incorporate new security 
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services as they become available; and integratable with 
existing security services. 
 
2.2 The Interoperability Challenge 
 
Services that traverse multiple domains and hosting 
environments need to be able to interact with each other, 
thus introducing the need for interoperability at multiple 
levels: At the protocol level, we require mechanisms 
that allow domains to exchange messages. This can be 
achieved via SOAP/HTTP, for example; At the policy 
level, secure interoperability requires that each party be 
able to specify any policy it may wish in order to 
engage in a secure conversation—and that policies 
expressed by different parties can be made mutually 
comprehensible; At the identity level, we require 
mechanisms for identifying a user from one domain in 
another domain. This requirement goes beyond the need 
to define trust relationships and achieve federation 
between security mechanisms (e.g., from Kerberos 
tickets to X.509 certificates).  
 
2.3 The Trust Relationship Challenge 
 
Grid service requests can span multiple security 
domains. Trust relationships among these domains play 
an important role in the outcome of such end-to-end 
traversals. A service needs to make its access 
requirements available to interested client entities, so 
that they understand how to securely request access to it. 
Trust establishment may be a one-time activity per 
session or it may be evaluated dynamically on every 
request. The dynamic nature of the Grid in some cases 
can make it impossible to establish trust relationships 
among sites prior to application execution [4]. Given 
that the participating domains may have different 
security infrastructures (e.g., Kerberos, PKI) it is 
necessary to realize the required trust relationships 
through some form of federation among the security 
mechanisms. 
 
The trust relationship problem is made more difficult in 
a Grid environment by the need to support the dynamic, 
user-controlled deployment and management of 
transient services [1]. End users create such transient 
services to perform request-specific tasks, which may 
involve the execution of user code. 
 
More details about Security Challenges in a Grid 
Environment occurred in Ref. [6]. 
 
3. GRID SECURITY REQUIREMENTS [5, 6] 
 
That the goal and purpose of Grid technologies is to 
support the sharing and coordinated use of diverse 
resources in dynamic, distributed VOs: in other words, 
to enable the creation, from distributed components, of 
virtual computing systems that are sufficiently 
integrated to deliver desired qualities of service. 
Security is one of the characteristics of an 
OGSA-compliant component. The basic requirements of 
an OGSA security model are that security mechanisms 
be pluggable and discoverable by a service requestor 
from a service description. This functionality then 
allows a service provider to choose from multiple 
distributed security architectures supported by multiple 
different vendors and to plug its preferred one(s) into 
the infrastructure supporting its Grid services. 
 
OGSA security must be seamless from edge of network 
to application and data servers, and allow the federation 
of security mechanisms not only at intermediaries, but 
also on the platforms that host the services being 
accessed. 
 
A Grid security solution should be based on existing 
standards wherever possible.  Security is an extremely 
complex problem, with specific solutions incrementally 
developed over many years by many extremely talented 
people. Further, the community generally only trusts a 
particular security solution if it has stood the tests of 
time and repeated scrutiny. 
 
However, Grid environments have a broad range of 
security requirements [3, 4].  Unfortunately, no single, 
existing, standard security solution addresses all of these 
requirements, though ideally a Grid security solution 
would extend existing standards.   
 
Grid authentication requirements include: Single sign on, 
Delegation, Integration with various local security 
solutions, User-based trust relationships. 
 
Grid requirements for communication protection 
include: Flexible message protection, Supports various 
reliable communication protocols, Supports independent 
data units (IDU). 
 
Grid authorization requirements include: Authorization 
by stakeholders, restricted delegation. 
 
Specification about the Security Requirements can be 
seen in Ref. [5, 6].  
 
4. GT2 GRID SECURITY MODEL [11] 
 
We first review briefly the security technologies 
incorporated in the Globus Toolkit version 2 (GT2) [12] 
before we survey the OGSA and GT3 security. GT2 
includes some services that use a common Grid Security 
Infrastructure (GSI) [3,4] to provide security 
functionality. 
 
Diverse site security mechanisms. GSI defines a 
common credential format based on X.509 identity 
certificates [13,14] and a common protocol based on 
transport layer security (TLS [15], SSL [16]).  
 
Dynamic creation of entities and the granting of 
privileges to those entities. GSI introduces X.509 proxy 
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certificates [14] that allow a user to assign dynamically 
a new X.509 identity to an entity and then delegate 
some subset of their rights to that identity. Users create 
a proxy certificate by issuing a new X.509 certificate 
signed using their own credentials instead of involving a 
CA. This mechanism allows new credentials and 
identities to be created quickly without the involvement 
of a traditional administrator. 
 
Dynamic creation and management of overlaid trust 
domains. The requirement for overlaid trust domains to 
establish VOs is satisfied by GSI using both proxy 
certificates and security services such as the Community 
Authorization Service (CAS) [17]. GSI has an implicit 
policy that any two entities bearing proxy certificates 
issued by the same user will inherently trust each other. 
This policy allows users to create trust domains 
dynamically by issuing proxy certificates to any 
services that they wish to collaborate.  
 
In designing GSI we evaluated several related efforts 
before electing to build on PKI. We noted the following 
shortcoming in other approaches with respect to Grid 
security requirements [11]: 
 
Kerberos [18] requires the explicit involvement of site 
administrators to establish interdomain trust 
relationships or to create new entities. 
 
The CRISIS wide area security system [19] defines a 
uniform and scalable security infrastructure for wide 
area systems but does not address interoperability with 
local security mechanisms. 
 
Secure Shell (SSH) [20] provides a strong system of 
authentication and message protection but has no 
support for translation between different mechanisms or 
for creation of dynamic entities. 
 
The Legion security model [21] is perhaps the most 
similar to that of GT2, using X.509 certificates for 
delegation. However, it lacks mechanisms for 
creation of dynamic entities.  
 
5. THE GT3 SECURITY MODEL FOR OGSA [11] 
 
We now turn to the question of how Grid security 
challenges can be addressed within the context of the 
Open Grid Services Architecture (OGSA) [9], a set of 
technical specifications that align Grid technologies 
with emerging Web services technologies [16]. 
 
Web services technologies allow software components 
to be defined in terms of access methods, bindings of 
these methods to specific communication mechanisms, 
and mechanisms for discovering relevant services. 
While particular mechanisms and methods are not 
prescribed, some mechanisms are emerging as 
ubiquitous.  
 
OGSA defines standard Web service interfaces and 
behaviors that add to Web services the concepts of 
stateful services and secure invocation. These interfaces 
and behaviors define what is called a “Grid service” and 
allow users to manage the Grid service’s life-cycle, as 
allowed by policy, and to create sophisticated 
distributed services. Grid services can define, as part of 
their interface, service data elements (SDEs) that other 
entities can (again, subject to policy) query or subscribe 
to. 
 
OGSA introduces both new opportunities and new 
challenges for Grid security. Emerging Web services 
security specifications address the expression of Web 
service security policy (WS-Policy [10], XACML [22]), 
standard formats for security token exchange 
(WS-Security [23], SAML [24]), and standard methods 
for authentication and establishment of security contexts 
and trust relationships (WS-SecureConversation [25], 
WS-trust [26]). These specifications may be exploited to 
create standard, interoperable methods for these feathers 
in Grid security. But they may, in some case, also need 
to be extended to address the Grid security requirements 
listed above. 
 
GT3 and its accompanying Grid Security Infrastructure 
(GSI3) provide the first implementation of OGSA 
mechanisms. GT3’s security model seeks to allow 
applications and users to operate on the Grid in as 
seamless and automated a manner as possible. Security 
mechanisms should not have to be instantiated in an 
application but instead should be supplied by the 
surrounding grid infrastructure, allowing the 
infrastructure to adapt on behalf of the application to 
meet the applications requirements. The application 
should need to deal with only application specific policy. 
GT3 uses the following powerful features of OGSA and 
Web services security to work toward this goal [11]: 
 
①. Cast security functionality as OGSA services to 
allow them to be located and used as needed by 
applications. 
②. Used sophisticated hosting environments to handle 
security for applications and allow security to adapt 
without having to change the application. 
③. Publishes service security policy so that clients can 
discover dynamically what credentials and mechanisms 
are needed to establish trust with the service. 
④. Specifies standards for the exchange of security 
tokens to allow for interoperability. 
 
5.1 Security as Services  
 
Secure operation in a Grid environment requires that 
applications and services be capable of supporting a 
variety of security functionality, such as authentication, 
authorization, credential conversion, auditing, and 
delegation. Grid applications need to interact with other 
applications and services that have a range of security 
mechanisms and requirements. These mechanisms and 
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requirements are likely to evolve over time as new 
mechanisms are developed or policies change. Grid 
applications must avoid embedding security 
mechanisms statically in order to adapt to changing 
requirements. 
 
The OGSA security model casts security functions as 
OGSA services. This strategy allows well-defined 
protocols and interfaces to be defined for these services 
and permits an application to outsource security 
functionality by using a security services with a 
particular implementation to fit its current need. 
 
5.2 Hosting Environment 
 
It is not a trivial task to fine and use security services 
such as those described in the preceding section: in fact, 
it can require considerable sophistication on the part of 
the application. Ideally, application developers should 
not be burdened with the details of this process. 
 
Grid services, like the Web services they leverage, may 
be built on sophisticated container-based hosting 
environments such as J2EE or .NET. These hosting 
environments provide a high level of functionality and 
allow for much security implementation complexity to 
be pulled from applications. It is envisioned that most 
security functionality will be placed in hosting 
environments, simplifying application development and 
allowing security functionality to be upgraded 
independently of applications. 
 
5.3 Publishing of Security Policy 
 
In order to establish trusts, two entities need to be able 
to find a common set of security mechanisms that both 
understand. The use of hosting environments and 
security services, as described previously, enables 
OGSA applications and services to adapt dynamically 
and use different security mechanisms. However, an 
application can select the proper security mechanisms 
and credentials only of it know what mechanisms and 
credentials are acceptable to the service with which it 
wishes to interact. 
 
The WS-Policy [10] specification and its related 
specifications define how a Web service can publish its 
security policy along with its interface specification as 
part of a WASL document. Such a published policy can 
express requirements for mechanisms, acceptable trust 
roots, token formats, and other security parameter. An 
application wishing to interact with the service can 
examine this published policy and gather the needed 
credentials and functionality by contacting appropriate 
OGSA security services. 
 
5.4 Specified format for Security Tokens 
 
The WS-Security [23], WS-SecureConversation [25], 
and WS-Trust [26] specifications contain conventions 
and formats for the communication of various 
mechanism specific tokens (e.g., Kerberos tickets and 
X.509 certificates) inside SOAP envelopes. This 
enveloping standardizes the protocol for security 
mechanisms and allows mechanisms to be independent 
of any application protocol. Hosting environments can 
recognize security-related messages and route them to 
an appropriate service for handling, and entities in the 
Network can recognize whether and how an interaction 
is secured.  
 
5.5   GT3 Security Advantages 
 
The Grid Security Infrastructure version 3 (GSI 3) of 
the Globus Toolkit version 3 is an initial implementation 
of key components of the OGSA security model 
described above. This implementation has two key 
advantages over its GT2 predecessor described in 
Section 4: 
 
① Use of WS-Security protocols and standards. GT3 
uses SOAP and the Web services security specifications 
for all of its communications. This allows it to leverage 
and use standard current and future Web service tools 
and software. 
② Tight least-privilege model. In contrast to GT2, the 
GT3 resource management implementation uses no 
privileged services. All privileged code is contained in 
two small, tightly constrained setuid programs. 
 
How these two advantages were implemented in GT3 





Besides the human factor (Users may become a threat to 
the security of the systems sometimes), Grid computing 
present so many security challenges that building a 
secure Grid environment is a complex task. The use of 
security technologies (e.g. policy languages, 
authorization services, encryption mechanisms) alone 
does not make for a secure system. GT3 implements the 
emerging OGSA; its GSI implementation (GSI 3) takes 
advantage of this evolution to improve on the security 
model used in earlier versions of the toolkit [11]. Its 
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